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WHAT IF ... BUCKLEY WERE 
OVERTURNED? 
Alan B. Morrison* 
On January 30, 1976, the Supreme Court issued its historic 
decision in Buckley v. Valeo/ which has set the constitutional 
contours of debate about campaign finance reform ever since. 
Many of those who would like to see the campaign finance laws 
changed have been frustrated by the parts of Buckley that struck 
down, under the First Amendment, limits on expenditures by 
candidates and on independent expenditures by others. In par-
ticular, they object to the portions of Buckley that treat the 
spending of money as equivalent to speech for First Amendment 
purposes and to the Court's rejection of Congress' imposition of 
limits on the amount of money that can be spent by candidates 
on their own behalf and by individuals and political committees 
independently of any candidate. They believe that it is necessary 
to overrule those parts of Buckley in order to achieve meaning-
ful chanpe in the financing of elections for public office in this 
country. 
The purpose of this essay is not to debate whether Buckley 
was properly decided (although it is impossible to skirt the ques-
tion entirely), nor whether it is necessary to overrule it in order 
* Mr. Morrison is an attorney with the Public Citizen Litigation. which he co-
founded with Ralph Nader in 1972. Funding for this essay was provided by the Florence 
and John Schumann Foundation. The research assistance of Remi Ratliff, J.D. Univer-
sity of Texas 1996, was invaluable. As always, the comments of my colleague and friend 
David Vladeck were insightful on matters great and small. Joshua Rosenkranz, Robert 
Stem, Kathleen Sullivan, and Morton Halperin read an early version and provided useful 
feedback. The views expressed are, in the end, my responsibility and no one else's. A 
prior, condensed version of this essay appeared in the January-February 1998 issue of 
The American Prospect. 
1. 424 u.s. 1 (1976). 
2. Some advocates of campaign finance reform believe that a constitutional 
amendment is the best way to overrule Buckley. That approach raises issues about how a 
constitutional amendment would fit with the remainder of First Amendment jurispru-
dence and whether creating special rules for election expenditures is an appropriate sub-
ject for a constitutional amendment. Those issues are beyond the scope of this paper. 
See The Constitution Project "Great and Extraordinary Occasions," Developing Guide-
lines for Constitutional Change (The Century Foundaton Press, 1999). 
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to reform our political system.3 Rather, the purpose is to explore 
what effect overruling Buckley would have on other related ar-
eas of First Amendment jurisprudence, an issue which has re-
ceived almost no attention. Under our system of constitutional 
adjudication based on precedent, it is nearly impossible to over-
rule a single decision-especially one as seminal as Buckley-
without significant ripple effects on both the precedents on 
which it was based and the cases that have subsequently cited it. 
Therefore, this analysis will consider both the cases on which 
Buckley relied to reach its conclusions, and those which have 
relied on Buckley itself. 
The paper begins with a discussion of the parts of Buckley 
on which the critics have focused. It describes the Court's rea-
soning and the precedent on which it relied to reach its conclu-
sions. Next it considers the impact that overturning the expendi-
ture rulings in Buckley would have on those authorities. The 
remainder of the paper then analyzes other subject areas beyond 
campaign finance reform where Buckley has had a major im-
pact-commercial speech, compulsory dues and fees, associa-
tional rights, fundraising activities, and non-electoral political 
speech-and attempts to assess what would happen in these ar-
eas if Buckley were overruled. 
A word about methodology. Our principal means of lo-
cating the areas in which Buckley has played a significant role 
was to examine the cases citing the relevant portions of Buckley. 
Since Buckley is long and is frequently cited, we limited our 
search to decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the fed-
eral Courts of Appeals, and the highest courts of the twelve larg-
est states. In addition, while writing this essay, I realized that 
there are a number of cases that do not cite Buckley itself but 
where Buckley's influence is nevertheless clear. The reason is 
that Buckley is often the first in a series of cases, and once the 
law advances beyond a certain point, more recent decisions are 
cited as stronger precedents than Buckley. Given this phenome-
non of the non-citation of Buckley, there may well be other areas 
of the law where Buckley has had a significant influence; those 
areas, however, could only be located by shepardizing not only 
Buckley, but all its progeny, a task beyond our limited resources. 
However, where we were aware of significant cases, or lines of 
3. Oearly some reforms can go forward with Buckley intact. An Act to Reform 
Campaign Finance, 117 Maine Legislature, Initiated Bill 5, LD 1823 (Nov. 5, 1996} 
(adding Chapter 4, Title 21, "The Maine Oear Election Act"). 
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cases4 which built on Buckley without citing it, we have included 
those as well. 
I. THE BUCKLEY DECISION. 
After a series of campaign scandals in the 1972 election, in-
cluding but not limited to the fundraising that contributed to 
Watergate, Congress took decisive action. It saw the problem in 
two parts: first, some people were making large contributions to 
candidates and parties, which at least gave the appearance of 
buying favors; second, races were considered to be too expensive 
to enable ordinary citizens to run for office, and some people, 
with their own money or with access to money from others, were 
thought to have too much influence, regardless of the source of 
the money or whether it was raised in large or small amounts. 
Thus, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 ("FECA")5 set 
limits on how much money an individual or a political action 
committee ("PAC") could give to a candidate and how much 
PACs, individuals, and candidates could spend with lawfully 
raised money. FECA had a number of other features, but for 
these purposes, only its expenditure and contributions limita-
tions 'are relevant. 
The lengthy opinion for the Court in Buckley was not signed 
by any single Justice, almost certainly because the decision was a 
joint product. In order to have the rules established for the 1976 
elections as early as possible, the case was considered on an ex-
pedited basis, with the decision issued less than three months af-
ter it was argued. The only dissenter on the expenditure issues 
was Justice White; however, Chief Justice Burger also dissented 
in part, because he would have invalidated more of the statute 
than the majority, also on First Amendment grounds. 
When campaign finance reformers speak of overruling 
Buckley, they do not mean the entire opinion. Indeed, they very 
much like the part which upholds the authority of Congress to 
control the size of contributions that individuals can make to 
candidates ($1,000 per election) and that PACs can make to 
candidates ($5,000 per election). And they also approve of the 
ruling that it is constitutional to condition receipt of federal 
benefits on an agreement to abide by reasonable conditions re-
lating to campaign spending. 
4. See notes 21-30. 
5. 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (1994). 
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Rather, their objections are focused on the limits on expen-
ditures, which in turn have several elements: (1) the overall 
amount that a candidate may spend from funds lawfully raised, 
principally from others; (2) the amount that an individual may 
spend on his or her own candidacy; and (3) the amount that an 
individual or a PAC may spend in support of, or opposition to, a 
candidate, but independent of that candidate or the candidate's 
opponent.6 
All of the Court's holdings have a common thread and a 
common rationale: in the context of political elections in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century, "virtually every means of 
communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expen-
diture of money."' This conclusion is often referred to as the no-
tion that "spending money is the equivalent of speech in a politi-
cal context for purposes of the First Amendment," in contrast to 
treating campaign spending as pure conduct which can be regu-
lated with less judicial scrutiny. 
In analyzing the issues, the Court relied on two related 
sets of rights- the right of the speaker who wishes to make his or 
her opinions heard, and the rights of individuals to associate to-
gether in order to make a greater impact than is possible if each 
person proceeded on his or her own. The Court saw these as 
two mutually reenforcing rights, especially in the context of po-
litical expression regarding elections, which the Court recog-
nized as one of the central purposes animating the First 
Amendment.8 
The Court's rationale proceeded roughly as follows. In 
United States v. O'Brien,9 the Court upheld a statute forbidding 
the burning of draft cards. The law was challenged on the 
ground that draft card burning was symbolic speech and hence 
entitled to the highest form of First Amendment protection. 
However, the 0 'Brien Court held that the non-speech reasons to 
support a ban on draft card burning- the law was needed to 
carry out the Selective Service registration system in effect at 
6. In describing the statutory scheme, the Buckley Court did not spet:ify the 
amounts of the ceilings except for item 3, the limit of $1,000 on independent expendi-
tures, but instead referred the reader to the statutory appendix. 424 U.S. at 13. That 
omission might have been due to the complexity of some of the limits, but it is also con-
sistent with the Court's overall approach that it was not quarreling with Congress over a 
particular limit, but instead disapproved of any government-established ceilings. 
7. Id. at 19. 
8. ld. at 14. 
9. 391 u.s. 367 (1968). 
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that time-sufficed to permit any incidental infringement on 
speech. To justify that result, the Court in 0' Brien found that 
the law was not intended to restrain speech, but was simply 
regulating conduct, which raised far fewer First Amendment 
concerns. 
The Buckley Court, however, rejected the analogy to 
O'Brien, even though it recognized that "[s]ome forms of com-
munication made possible by the giving and spending of money 
involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some 
involve a combination of the two. "10 The Court then went on to 
observe that it "has never suggested that the dependence of a 
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to 
introduce a non-speech element or to reduce the exacting scru-
tiny required by the First Amendment."11 
In support of that proposition, the Court cited several cases. 
First, it relied on Bigelow v. Virginia, 12 in which the Court set 
aside a conviction for publishing a paid ad for abortion services 
to be performed in New York, where they were legal, in a news-
paper in Virginia where (prior to Roe v. Wade) abortions were 
illegal. The Court also relied on New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van,13 in which the First Amendment was held to be a defense to 
a charge of libel against the New York Times, which had been 
paid to publish an advertisement critical of the racist conduct of 
certain Alabama officials. What is important in both of these 
cases for purposes of Buckley is that the First Amendment was 
seen as a shield, not just for the person whose ideas were being 
published, but also for the person who received the money which 
the principal speaker paid to have the message delivered. In ad-
dition, the Court cited Cox v. Louisiana,14 which contrasted pick-
eting with both newspaper comments and a telegram expressing 
a point of view, noting that the latter involved "a pure form of 
expression" even though sending a telegram obviously involved 
an expenditure of money.15 
The Court further distinguished the O'Brien line of cases on 
the ground that the government interest there was not in "sup-
pressing communication. "16 In contrast, the goal of limiting 
10. 424 U.S. at 16. 
II. ld. 
12. 421 u.s. 809 (1975). 
13. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
14. Buckley, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). 
15. 424 U.S. at 16. 
16. ld. at 17 
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campaign expenditures is to equalize the relative abilities of in-
dividuals to affect the outcome of elections by capping the 
amounts that could be spent. As the Court observed, the FECA 
restrictions being challenged "impose[ d] direct quantity restric-
tions on political communication[s] and association(s]," unlike 
O'Brien, which allowed the draft card burner to express his posi-
tion as often he wanted as long as he did not destroy his draft 
card in doing so.17 The Court further noted that the challenged 
provisions "reduce[ d] the quantity of expression by restricting 
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, 
and the size of the audience reached."1 Although O'Brien can 
be criticized for its conclusions that protection of the draft card 
served military preparedness functions and that the law was not 
solely intended to suppress speech, those rationales do distin-
guish the law from FECA, which was defended on the ground 
that too much electoral speech was itself an evil that could be at-
tacked by the government. Accordingly, because the Court 
viewed FECA as imposing output restrictions on political 
speech, it concluded that the highest form of First Amendment 
scrutiny would be required to sustain the expenditure ceilings.19 
Having settled on the standard of review, the Court first ex-
amined the $1,000 limit on expenditures by individuals, which it 
found prevented almost all independent communications, and 
then the ceilings on total spending by a candidate. Although the 
latter were much higher than the limits for individuals, the Court 
found that they still substantially restricted what candidates 
could spend. The Court also observed that the restrictions on 
overall candidate spending limited the rights of association of 
other would-be contributors by putting a ceiling on total mone-
tary contributions, thereby effectively precluding some individu-
als from associating with the candidate of their choice by pro-
viding financial support. The Court also noted that these limits 
17. ld. at 18. 
18. ld. at 19. 
19. In a subsequent portion of the opinion, the Court distinguished between contri-
butions made to a candidate, on the one hand, and expenditures either made by a candi-
date or made by an individual or PAC independently of any candidate, on the other. Id. 
at 21-23. The Court found that contributions are entitled to less First Amendment pro-
tection, in part because the act of giving money is less of an expression of one's views 
than is, for example, taking out an advertisement to support a candidate. The distinction 
between contributions and expenditures can be criticized either as insufficiently protec-
tive of the right to contribute, or as too protective of the right to spend, because the me-
dium of communication in both cases can be seen as spending money. This essay as-
sumes the continued viability of that distinction unless the expenditure ceilings rulings in 
Buckley are overturned. 
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still allowed other individuals to donate as much of their time as 
they chose, thereby discriminating between those who had time 
to devote to political work and those who had money. 
The Court further observed that the $1,000 limitation on in-
dependent expenditures by groups such as PACs "precludes 
most associations from effectively amplifying the voices of their 
adherents, the original basis for the recognition of the First 
Amendment protection of freedom of association."20 In support 
of that proposition, the Court relied on cases such as NAACP v. 
Alabama,21 in which the State sought to obtain from the NAACP 
a list of the names of its financial supporters, over an objection 
based on the First Amendment right of association. Because the 
Court concluded that the right to associate extended to those 
who do so by making contributions, the Court rejected the 
State's efforts to obtain that information.22 The Court concluded 
its general discussion of expenditure limits by stating that 
FECA's expenditure rules "impose[d] significantly more severe 
restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and as-
sociation than do [the] limitations on financial contributions."23 
With respect to the different types of limitations, the Court 
first upheld the $1,000 limit on contributions to candidates be-
cause it did not "undermine to any material degree the potential 
for robust and effective discussion of candidates, and campaign 
issues by individual citizens, associations, the institutional press, 
candidates, and political parties."24 The adverse impact of this 
ruling on the level of political debate was diminished by the 
Court's next holding, striking down expenditure limits because 
they "impose[d] direct and substantial restraints on the quantity 
of political speech," most dramatically the $1,000 limitation for 
independent expenditures by individuals and groups.25 The 
Court found that "a primary effect of these expenditure limita-
tions is to restrict the quantity of campaign speech by individu-
als, groups and candidates" by prohibiting individuals "from 
voicing their views ... through means that entail aggregate ex-
penditures of more than $1,000 during a calendar year."26 
20. Id. at 22. 
21. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
22. The Court also cited Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), and 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Although both cases focused on rights of asso-
ciation, they were in a context where money was not a major concern. 
23. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23. 
24. ld. at 29. 
25. ld. at 39. 
26. ld. at 40. At that point the Court noted that the cost of a quarter page adver-
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In a subsequent part of its opinion, the Court dealt with the 
asserted governmental interest in equalizing the ability of candi-
dates to make their views known. In rejecting that rationale as a 
justification for a restriction on speech, the Court observed that 
"the concept that government may restrict the speech of some 
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voices of 
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment," citing New 
York Times v. Sullivanv and cases cited by it.28 The Court also 
cited Mills v. Alabama,29 and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo,30 both of which struck down burdens on First Amend-
ment rights, although, unlike Bigelow and Sullivan, neither in-
volved situations in which the spending of money was a signifi-
cant aspect of the speech being protected. In Mills, the 
restriction forbade the publication of editorials, but only on the 
day of an election, and in Tornillo the publisher was free to write 
whatever it chose, but it was required to provide an opportunity 
for a reply if the newspaper criticized a candidate for elected of-
fice. Since the Court in Buckley saw the expenditure limitations 
imposed by Congress in FECA to be more sweeping than those 
it had set aside in Mills and Tornillo, it had no choice but to 
strike them down also. 
Finally, the Court rejected efforts to limit spending by can-
didates from their personal or family resources, observing that a 
candidate, no less than others, has the right to "vigorously and 
tirelessly ... advocate his own election."31 Indeed, the Court 
noted, the fact that candidates use their own money lessens the 
problem of corruption which was identified as the rationale for 
sustaining limits on contributions by others.32 In the end, the 
Court concluded that the primary purpose of the restriction on 
personal spending was to limit the total spending in elections, 
but this, the Court said, could not be done: 
The First Amendment denies government the power to 
determine that spending to promote one's political 
views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise. In the free soci-
ety ordained by our Constitution it is not the govern-
ment, but the people-individually as citizens and can-
tisement in a major metropolitan daily exceeded $1,000. Id. 
27. 376 U.S. at 266,269. 
28. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. 
29. 384 u.s. 214 (1966). 
30. 418 u.s. 241 (1974). 
31. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 52. 
32. Id. at 53, 55. 
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didates and collectively as associations and political 
committees-who must retain the control over the 
quantity and range of debate on public issues in a politi-
1 . 33 ca campatgn. 
355 
Justice White's dissent is noteworthy principally for what it 
did not say on these issues. He began with a general discussion 
of the power of Congress to regulate elections, which was not in 
dispute in Buckley, and then considered the First Amendment 
issues for nearly seven pages. During that discussion, he did not 
cite a single case to support his position, nor did he specifically 
indicate his disagreement with the holdings of the cases on which 
the majority relied or on their applicability to this issue. For 
those reasons, it is difficult to determine the precise basis for Jus-
tice White's disagreement, beyond his clearly expressed view 
that the judgments of Congress and the President on these issues 
should be respected.34 
What does seem reasonably clear from Justice White's dis-
sent is that he is much more willing to tolerate regulation of po-
litical campaigns, where the legislature has identified dangers to 
the political process, "[a]t least so long as the ceiling placed upon 
the candidates is not plainly too low .... "35 It is also apparent 
that Justice White is far more willing to accept rationales based 
on "the integrity of federal campaigns, "36 and that, for him, the 
related concern arising from the perception that money can buy 
elections is sufficient to trump whatever First Amendment con-
siderations stand in the way.37 
II. POSSIBLE BASES FOR OVERRULING BUCKLEY 
In my view, the Buckley majority has the better of the con-
stitutional argument, but that is not the focus of the remainder of 
this inquiry. Rather, taking the majority opinion as a given, the 
question is, what would happen to First Amendment jurispru-
dence if the Court overturned the expenditure rulings in Buck-
ley? Before examining the impact of such a ruling on both the 
cases on which Buckley relied and the cases that have followed 
33. I d. at 57. 
34. Perhaps the press of time explains why Justice White and the majority did not 
specifically respond to the authorities cited by the other, although, by and large, the ma-
jority dealt with the substance of Justice White's objections in its opinion. 
35. ld. at 265-66. 
36. ld. at 266. 
37. ld. 
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it, it is necessary to consider the various grounds on which 
Buckley might be overruled or narrowed. 
Among political activists- if not academics-who call for 
overruling Buckley, the most popular cry is for reversing the 
conclusion that spending money to run for office is speech under 
the First Amendment. Such a ruling would permit government 
to regulate the total amount that a candidate could spend, the 
amount of an individual's personal wealth that could be used in 
his or her own race, and the amount that an individual or a 
group could spend on independent expenditures. With those 
rulings, the government could control both contributions and 
expenditures and might well set much lower limits on contribu-
tions than the courts have been willing to uphold.38 
A second possibility is that the Court might agree that 
spending money in an election contest is speech, but conclude 
that, because the regulation is content-neutral, it should be 
treated like an economic regulation, subject to more limited 
scrutiny, as in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,39 and 
Turner Broadcasting System Inc. v. FCC.IIJ But the "market" in 
elections is quite different from that in agricultural commodities 
or cable television, especially when the focus is on independent 
expenditures and direct speech by candidates. It seems highly 
unlikely that the Court would continue to equate spending 
money with speech in an election context, and yet, at the same 
time, treat elections as markets, subject to economic regulation 
not limited by the First Amendment. Moreover, since spending 
limits apply only to election-related speech, it is difficult to 
imagine that the Court would say that the rules are not based on 
the content of the speech.41 Thus, as long as spending limits are 
imposed only on speech in connection with elections, it seems 
extremely unlikely that the Court would take this route rather 
than a more direct approach to overruling Buckley. Therefore, 
this essay will not consider what would happen to other First 
Amendment cases if this second rationale were adopted. 
A third way the result in Buckley might be overturned is if 
the Court found the reasons in support of the rules-either those 
38. See, e.g., National Black Police Ass'n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, 
924 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1996). 
39. 111 s. a. 2130 (1997). 
40. 111 s. a. 1174 (1997). 
41. Although these rules are content based, because they apply only to speech 
(spending) involving elections, they are not viewpoint based since they do not single out 
certain parties or candidates for disfavored treatment. 
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argued in Buckley or other rationales-to be sufficiently com-
pelling to satisfy the strict scrutiny demands of the First 
Amendment. Using this logic, the following corruption argu-
ment (or something like it) might succeed: candidates can be 
corrupted by independent expenditures, as well as by direct con-
tributions; candidates who must raise large amounts of money, 
even in amounts of no more than $1,000, are corrupted by the 
process and only spending limits can prevent that from happen-
ing; accretions of individual wealth used by a candidate on his or 
her own election is corrupting of the system because such wealth 
is unrelated to broad political support for the ideas of its fiscal 
backer; and at some level, spending money is no longer a com-
munication function but rather a reflection of economic power, 
which government may regulate. The bottom line is that the 
government, at some point, can decide that enough spending 
(speech) is enough in races for elected offices. 
Several points are significant regarding these possible ra-
tionales for allowing the government to place some limits on 
electoral spending. First, the impact on other cases would de-
pend in large part on which rationale was accepted. Second, to 
the extent that these rationales recognize that spending money is 
a protected activity, but only up to a point, they ask the Court to 
draw lines, which it has been very reluctant to do (rightly in my 
judgment), although it did approve the lines drawn by Congress 
for contributions. Third, some rationales allow regulation of to-
tal expenditures by a candidate, but not independent expendi-
tures, while the reverse is true for others. Not only would that 
affect the impact on other cases, but it also suggests that the 
Court is unlikely to start tinkering with parts of the Buckley rul-
ing, while leaving others in place. 
Given the multiple possible grounds available for limiting 
parts of Buckley or overruling it on a narrow basis, it would take 
an essay several times the length of this one to cover all of the 
options. Therefore, this essay will assume that any overruling 
will be on one of two grounds: (1) that spending money should 
not be treated as speech in an election context, which is the ra-
tionale advanced by the most vocal political proponents of over-
ruling Buckley and is the broadest ground for doing so, or (2) 
that at some point the government may step in to set overall 
spending limits in order to cleanse the election process. Because 
the focus of this essay is on the impact of overruling Buckley on 
other cases, the discussion is organized around those cases, with 
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either or both of the rationales brought in, depending on which 
is applicable. 
III. IMPACf ON OTHER CASES 
The decisions on which Buckley relied to reach its conclu-
sions regarding the constitutionality of expenditure limitations 
fall into two categories: (a) those that lead to the conclusion that 
campaign expenditures should be treated as speech rather than 
conduct; and (b) those that help assess whether the governmen-
tal interests in favor of expenditure limitations are sufficient to 
sustain the rules under this heightened scrutiny. 
A. PRE-BUCKLEYDECISIONS 
The two principal cases cited by the Court were Bigelow v. 
Virginia,42 (decided just seven months before Buckley), and New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.43 If Buckley were overturned on the 
theory that campaign expenditures are conduct and not speech 
for First Amendment purposes, these decisions would be in seri-
ous jeopardy, or would at least require a different rationale to 
sustain them.44 
In both Bigelow and Sullivan, the defendant had printed an 
ad in a newspaper which was alleged to be illegal (Bigelow) or 
libelous (Sullivan). In neither case was the defendant the pri-
mary speaker, but simply the entity that had accepted money to 
run an ad that was prepared by another person, either with the 
goal of selling a service (Bigelow), or expressing an opinion 
(Sullivan). In contrast, the speakers covered by Buckley, whose 
expenditures, and hence whose speech, would be limited, are the 
very persons who seek to have their messages widely dissemi-
nated, either about their own candidacies, or those of persons 
whom they support or oppose. In all three cases, of course, the 
dissemination costs money. Therefore, if Buckley were reversed 
on the theory that spending money takes speech outside of the 
First Amendment, advertisements taken out in all forms of me-
dia would be treated principally as conduct involving the receipt 
of money, and the speech in Bigelow and Sullivan would be un-
protected, at least under this rationale. 
42. 421 u.s. 809 (1975). 
43. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
44. That result might also produce an expansion of O'Brien, a case with which most 
supporters of First Amendment rights are uncomfortable. 
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Put another way, the fact that a publisher receives money, 
either for an advertisement or for the sale of its product, has 
never been seen to make the First Amendment inapplicable. 
But if the expenditure limits in Buckley were overturned on the 
theory that paying for speech is conduct not entitled to First 
Amendment protection, it is doubtful that that proposition 
would survive-at least for advertisements. Thus, although all of 
the primary speakers would still be able to receive First 
Amendment protection in stating their views, if they sought to 
amplify their messages, which inevitably costs money, that activ-
ity would probably not be entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion if Buckley were overruled. 
Whether the same fate would befall other parts of a news-
paper or other publication is less clear. For example, to the ex-
tent that newspapers provide commercial information, such as 
stock market quotes or racing results, they could be seen as 
businesses that sell information, with those items given reduced 
protection, like formal advertisements. But even if the Court 
ruled that "money is not speech" under the First Amendment, 
the decision to sell a newspaper or a book, rather than give it 
away, would not deprive it of its First Amendment protections. 
The second group of cases relied on in setting aside the ex-
penditure limits were the right of association cases, principally 
NAACP v. Alabama,45 in which the Court used that branch of 
First Amendment jurisprudence to prevent the state from ob-
taining the names of the NAACP's financial supporters. Again, 
if collecting money is simply conduct, the names of those con-
tributors would no longer be protected by the First Amendment. 
However, other supporters, who did not give money, would not 
have their identities disclosed, at least on this theory. Indeed, 
some of the disclosures might not involve contributors, but per-
sons with whom the NAACP did business, who might still prefer 
not to have their association made public. Yet the identities of 
everyone who made a contribution or did business with any non-
profit would be subject to disclosure if Buckley were overturned, 
unless some other provision of the Constitution came to the res-
cue. 
The other cat~ory of associational cases is exemplified by 
NAACP v. Button, a case also cited by the Buckley majority. In 
Button, the State of Virginia had regulated the practice of law in 
45. 357 u.s. 449 (1958). 
46. 371 u.s. 415 (1963). 
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a manner that prevented the NAACP from gaining access to the 
courts to advance its political and social goals of fostering inte-
gration. However, the Court held that, in doing so, Virginia 
violated the NAACP's First Amendment right of association. 
Although Button did not involve economic rights, follow-up 
cases, such as United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n,41 did. 
There the right of association was used to enable the minework-
ers union to help its members bring workers' compensation 
cases, despite State Bar rules forbidding such assistance. That 
holding would be in serious jeopardy if seeking to recover 
money damages for personal injuries sustained by members of 
the union, as in United Mine Workers, like seeking to spend 
money in an election on behalf of a group that wished to support 
or oppose a candidate, were entitled to diminished First 
Amendment protection. 
The second part of the Buckley expenditure analysis-
finding that the claimed state interests were insufficient to 
override the First Amendment-was based in large part on 
FECA and its operation. As noted above, the Court upheld the 
limitations set by Congress on the amount that one person could 
give to a candidate in an election in order to prevent corruption 
or the appearance of it. But when the same anti-corruption 
rationale was used to defend the expenditure limitations, the 
Court reasoned that contribution limits, not spending caps, were 
the best way to control corruption, thereby undermining the 
asserted interest in limiting spending by candidates.48 Second, 
the Court ruled that, for those who were spending their own 
money, either on their own candidacy or for independent 
expenditures, there is no anti-corruption basis for limits in those 
situations since one cannot corrupt oneself with one's own 
money. Since it found no other compelling justification for the 
various spending caps, it found them to be unconstitutional. 
To support its conclusions, the Court cited several cases that 
would also be in danger if the Court were now to accept any of 
the rationales offered to defend these various expenditure limits. 
In this part of the opinion, the Court again relied on New York 
Times v. Sullivan, principally to make the point that the First 
47. 389 u.s. 217 (1967). 
48. In a similar vein, the Court cited with approval the observation made by Judge 
Tamm in the Court of Appeals that expenditure limits would be irrational if, for exam-
ple, they forbade a candidate from spending money which he had raised by collecting one 
dollar from every voter, since there could be no possible corrupting influence in that 
situation. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56 n.64. 
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Amendment never allows the suppression of the quantity of 
speech, while harking back to its point on the need for money to 
amplify one's voice to reach a larger audience. To the extent 
that this aspect of Buckley focused on a different part of Sulli-
van, that, too, would be in jeopardy because the Court again re-
jected the notion that the First Amendment allows a person to 
state his views, but also allows the state to limit their dissemina-
tion. Again, Sullivan might survive because it is so firmly en-
trenched in our First Amendment jurisprudence, but some dif-
ferent analysis would be required to reach that result. 
The other cases relied on in Buckley bore on the question of 
the relative severity of the expenditure restrictions in FECA. 
The Court saw the expenditure limits as ceilings on the total 
quantity of speech in an election, and it contrasted those restric-
tions with two cases in which it found a far less serious intrusion 
to be invalid, even though in neither of the cases was there a cu-
mulative limit on the amount of speech that could be made by 
any one person. Thus, in Mills v. Alabama,49 the limitation only 
applied to editorials regarding candidates on election day and 
was intended to prevent unfair surprises. In Tornillo there were 
no limitations on what a newspaper could say so long as it was 
willing to give the political candidate who was criticized an op-
portunity to reply, which was claimed to be necessary to enable 
him to defend himself. Although the Court considered both of 
those restrictions to be far less severe than the expenditure limits 
in Buckley-a judgment that is unlikely to be altered in the fu-
ture-it struck down all of the limits as inconsistent with the 
First Amendment. Thus, if spending money on political speech 
is protected as speech, and not considered pure conduct, the only 
way that this part of Buckley could be overturned would be if the 
Court concluded that all of the restrictions-in Mills, Tornillo 
and Buckley-are constitutional because the interests advanced 
are sufficiently weighty to overcome the First Amendment. 
Even though the laws at issue in all three cases seek to foster 
democratic and fair elections, an interest of the highest order, it 
is highly unlikely that the Court would suddenly find that even 
those lofty interests outweigh the longstanding rules that any di-
rect interference with the First Amendment activities can not be 
sustained. 
In conclusion, it is difficult to imagine how Bigelow, New 
York Times v. Sullivan, NAACP v. Alabama, United Mine 
49. 384 u.s. 214 (1966). 
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Workers v. Illinois, Mills or Tornillo could survive an overruling 
of Buckley on the issue of limiting expenditures in campaigns for 
elected office. 
B. POST-BUCKLEYCASES 
1. Commercial Speech 
For many years prior to 1975, the generally accepted juris-
prudence under the First Amendment was that commercial 
speech was not entitled to any protection.50 The doctrine began 
to evolve in Bigelow v. Virginia,51 a case which was specifically 
relied on in Buckley for the proposition that spending money for 
political purposes was speech under the First Amendment. Four 
months later, the Court completed its commercial speech revolu-
tion in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's 
Consumer Council, Inc. 52 
In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, consumers successfully 
challenged a Virginia statute that made it unlawful to advertise 
the price of prescription drugs as a violation of the First 
Amendment. In terms of First Amendment doctrine, the out-
come is striking because paid commercial speech is at the other 
end of the spectrum from speech regarding political elections, 
since commercial speech merely seeks to promote conduct which 
itself is not entitled to First Amendment protection. Therefore, 
if the money spent in Buckley were not considered speech, 
surely the money spent advertising the prices of prescriptions 
drugs would not be protected under the First Amendment; in 
that event, the Virginia law would have been judged solely under 
the very lenient tests applied to economic regulations. While the 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy opinion went well beyond Buckley, 
if Buckley's treatment of spending as speech were reversed, the 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy decision almost certainly could not 
stand. The result, as the Court noted, is that consumers would 
be kept in the dark about the price of a product which may be 
essential to their health.53 
The following year the Court decided the second in what 
has become a long series of commercial speech cases. In Bates v. 
50. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
51. 421 u.s. 809 (1975). 
52. 425 u.s. 748 (1976). 
53. Id. at 763-64. 
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State Bar of Arizona,54 the Court set aside discipline imposed 
against two lawyers who ran an advertisement for their legal 
clinic which delivered reduced price legal services intended for 
middle and lower income consumers. Again, Buckley and Vir-
ginia Board of Pharmacy were central to the proposition that 
speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because it 
is in the form of paid advertising. 
Over the next twenty years, the Supreme Court's commer-
cial speech jurisprudence has been a major source of First 
Amendment protection for those who wish to speak and need to 
spend money in order to do so. In most of the cases, Buckley 
was not cited because the direct commercial speech cases such as 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy and the subsequent Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp v. Public Service Comm'n of N. Y.,55 (where 
the Court's four part test was established), were relied on.56 
Nonetheless, it is clear that none of the protections for commer-
cial speech would have been possible without Buckley, and they 
would almost certainly be overturned if Buckley's rules on ex-
penditure limits were reversed on the ground that spending 
money is not speech for the purpose of the First Amendment. 57 
2. Mandatory Spending Cases 
Under various federal and state labor laws, individuals can 
be required to pay money to a union or other collective bar-
gaining agent authorized to bargain on their behalf, even if they 
do not wish to become members of the union. Some of those 
who were required to pay the fees objected on the grounds that 
some of the money was being spent for purposes of which they 
disapproved-such as lobbying or other ideological activities-
and that were unrelated to the collective bargaining rationale 
that entitled the union to charge non-members for their service. 
In one such challenge, Abood v. Detroit Board of Educa-
tion,58 the Court concluded that unions could not use mandatory 
54. 433 u.s. 350 (1977). 
55. 447 u.s. 557 (1980). 
56. But see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 420 (1993) 
(Buckley cited in quote from Virginia Bd of Pharmacy). 
57. The commercial speech doctrine, propelled by Buckley, has been extended be-
yond advertising for traditional products and services. Thus, in Carlin Communications, 
Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984), the Court cited Buckley in setting aside an FCC 
regulation limiting Dial-a-Porn service except between 9:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. and re-
quiring that the payment be by credit card before transmission of the message. 
58. 431 u.s. 209 (1977). 
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payments for expenditures unrelated to collective bargaining if 
the person making the payment objected. In ruling that the First 
Amendment protected the objectors in Abood, the Court relied 
on Buckley for the principle that contributing to an organization 
for the purpose of spreading a message that the contributor sup-
ports is protected by the Constitution and that, therefore, the 
Constitution also gives individuals the right to object to their 
money being spent to send messages of which they disapprove. 
As subsequent cases make clear, the proper remedy is not simply 
to require a disclaimer, so that the objectors are not associated 
with the offending speech, but rather to entitle the dues-payer to 
a rebate of the portion of the dues used for ideological, as op-
posed to collective bargaining, purposes. Once again, it is clear 
that, without the recognition in Buckley that spending of money 
is speech for First Amendment purposes, there could have been 
no First Amendment challenge to compelled expenditures by 
collective bargaining agents such as unions. 59 
Another area in which the mandatory spending issue has 
arisen is in the context of state universities, which may include 
either a mandatory fee or a negative check-off system, under 
which a student must object to the fee before registration or pay 
it. There have been a series of cases (some successful} in which 
Abood-type objections have been raised to a check-off system, 
and others are currently being litigated involving mandatory 
fees. For example, in Gaida v. Bloustein,(iJ the negative check-off 
for the student Public Interest Research Group was challenged, 
and Buckley was cited as supporting the proposition that com-
pulsory contributions for purposes for which students are ideo-
logically opposed are as much a constitutional infringement as 
would be a prohibition against contributions to those groups. 
The Court sent the case back for further scrutiny under the 
heightened First Amendment standard, and the challengers' po-
sition was upheld on the second appeal.61 Once again the Court 
relied on Buckley for the proposition that a forced expenditure 
of money violates the First Amendment and can only be justified 
59. In some of the subsequent cases dealing with compulsory payments, Buckley 
was cited, see Lehnen v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 522 (1991), while in others it 
was not, Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990), although in Keller the reli-
ance on Buckley principles was clear from the lower court's opinion. See Keller v. State 
Bar of California, 226 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Cal. Q. App. 1986). 
60. 686 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1982). 
61. GaJda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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by compelling state interests. Clearly, if spending money is not 
speech, these cases would have to be reversed. 
Current challenges to mandatory spending provisions pro-
ceed on the same Buckley rationale. The principal difference is 
that the states are defending their rules on the ground that the 
criteria for determining which organizations receive the funding 
are neutral and that the money being spent furthers the educa-
tional goals of the university.62 Again, there is no dispute about 
the applicability of the central proposition of Buckley regarding 
the equation of speech and the expenditure of money; the only 
dispute is over whether the asserted state interests are an appro-
priate counter-balance.63 
In a related context, efforts by a state to enhance the voice 
of one speaker at the expense of another were rejected in Pacific 
Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California. fA 
The Utilities Commission there had directed the company to al-
low a consumer organization to include in its monthly billing 
statement (at no cost to the company) an insert to solicit mem-
bers. The utility contended that this directive violated its First 
Amendment rights by requiring it to transmit a message that it 
opposed. The first part of the Buckley expenditure analysis-
equating speech with money-was not at issue in Pacific Gas, 
but the rationale on which the State relied to sustain those 
mandatory expenditure requirements-the need to enhance the 
voice of those less able to speak-was explicitly rejected there as 
in Buckley. If the directive at issue in Pacific Gas had been sus-
tained, and if the Utilities Commission then sought to impose 
the additional costs on the company, instead of the consumer 
62. See Hays County Guordian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 122-24 (5th Cir. 1992), cen. 
denied, 506 U.S. 1087 (1993). The Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear a case in 
which the Seventh Circuit ruled that the use of a mandatory student activity fee to fund 
political organizations violated the First Amendment rights of objecting students. 
Southwonh v. Grebe, 157 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. a. 1332 (1999). 
63. The outcome of these cases may depend on the applicability of FCC v. League 
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), in which the Court sustained a challenge to the 
ban on editorializing by non-commercial broadcasting stations that received grants from 
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. The government argued that one purpose of 
the law was to prevent the use of taxpayers' money to promote views with which some 
taxpayers disagreed. However, the Court, relying on Buckley, observed that virtually 
every congressional appropriation will involve a use of public money that some taxpayer 
finds objectionable, and that, therefore, other governmental interests must be found to 
sustain that kind of a ban. 
64. 475 u.s. 1 (1986). 
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group, the first element of Buckley would also have been cited to 
protect Pacific Gas.65 
Another offshoot of Buckley's equating compelled expendi-
tures with speech arose in a somewhat unusual context in People 
v. Warren.66 The defendant was convicted of attempted criminal 
possession of a weapon. He pled guilty, was fined $2,500, and 
was ordered to contribute an additional $2,500 to a gun control 
advocacy organization. The court overturned the latter portion 
of the sentence, citing Buckley for the proposition that forced 
political contributions could not be required. 
3. Associational Rights 
In the portions of its opinion discussing the rights of both 
political committees and individuals to make contributions to 
candidates, the Buckley Court recognized that it was dealing not 
only with the right of free speech, but also the right of free asso-
ciation: these rights are often seen as mutually reenforcing under 
the First Amendment. The associational aspect of Buckley has 
also been used to establish First Amendment protection in sub-
sequent cases. 
For example, In re Primus,67 involved a disciplinary action 
brought against a lawyer who had solicited a client on behalf of 
the American Civil Liberties Union. The act of solicitation was 
recognized as being more than simply speech, but was nonethe-
less protected because of the associational rights recognized in 
Buckley and other cases. The importance of the First Amend-
ment's associational aspects was also made clear in a decision 
rendered the same day as the Primus case, Ohralik v. Ohio State 
Bar Ass'n.68 In Ohralik, the same type of conduct-solicitation 
of a client (albeit while the client was still in the hospital after an 
65. Two years ago. the Supreme Court divided 5-4 on whether mandatory payments 
by California fruit growers could be used for advertising, when certain growers would not 
benefit from the advertising. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &: Elliott, Inc., 117 S. a. 2130 
(1997). The majority rejected the Abood line of cases because there was no ideological 
objection to the spending, and it also found that the commercial speech doctrine was not 
implicated because the advertising requirement was an aspect of economic regulation, 
not regulation of speech. Although the dissent disagreed on both propositions, no one 
challenged the Buckley holding that spending money is an action protected by the First 
Amendment and that mandatory spending requirements can, in some situations, violate 
the First Amendment. See also Turner, 117 S. a. 1174 (1997) (coerced carriage of 
broadcast signals over cable television facilities upheld as economic, not speech regula-
tion). 
66. 452 N.Y.S.2d 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
67. 436 u.s. 412 (1978). 
68. 436 u.s. 447. 
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automobile accident)-was held to be unprotected by the First 
Amendment, in part because there was no associational interest 
at stake as there was in In re Primus. 
In Ozonoff v. Berzak,69 the fact that the payment of money 
was involved did not preclude the application of the First 
Amendment's associational rights. A physician had refused to 
undergo a loyalty check required for employment with the 
World Health Organization. The court, citing Buckley, found 
that the doctor's First Amendment rights of association were in-
fringed, even though he was being paid money in exchange for 
his employment. A similar approach was used in Marshall v. 
Stevens People and Friends for Freedom.70 In that case, the Sec-
retary of Labor sued to enforce subpoenas against several indi-
viduals and committees who opposed the unionization of the J.P. 
Stevens textile mills. The Secretary wanted the list of contribu-
tors to the committees, and they argued that enforcement of the 
subpoenas would infringe their rights of association under the 
First Amendment. The court relied on Buckley to conclude that, 
with respect to the non-supervisory employees of Stevens, the 
government did not adequately justify its need for the informa-
tion about the contributors, and hence the First Amendment 
precluded the enforcement of those subpoenas. 
4. Raising Money 
Although Buckley involved First Amendment protection for 
spending money, the Court has extended its rationale to raising 
money in order to spend it. The extension is justified because, as 
a practical matter, the ability to raise money, in order to speak, 
often depends on the right to spend money in order to raise that 
money. Meyer v. Granl involved a challenge to a Colorado 
statute that made it a felony to pay any person to circulate an 
initiative petition. Proponents of a proposed constitutional 
amendment concluded that they could not obtain the necessary 
signatures without paying signature gatherers, and they chal-
lenged the statute on First Amendment grounds. Comparing the 
prohibition to the campaign expenditure limitations struck down 
in Buckley, the Court noted that the law necessarily reduced the 
quantity of expression available and that it was impermissible to 
silence those who could afford to pay for petition circulators. 
69. 744 F.2d 224 (1st Cir. 1984). 
70. 669 F.2d 171 (4th Cir. 1981). 
71. 486 u.s. 414 (1988). 
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Again, relying on Buckley, the Court held that it was not a per-
missible state interest for government to restrict the speech of 
one group in order to enhance the speech of another. 
Buckley has also been cited in other comparable circum-
stances. Thus, in Hardie v. Fong Eu,72 the California Supreme 
Court relied on Buckley to sustain a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of statutes limiting the amounts that could be spent in 
circulating initiative petitions. A similar challenge was also suc-
cessful in New Jersey Citizen Action v. Edison Township.13 At 
issue was a municipal ordinance that required, among other 
things, that canvassers be fingerprinted in order to obtain a li-
cense. Based on Buckley, the Court struck down the finger-
printing provision because the state's interests in disclosure were 
insufficient. Obviously, raising money via the canvass would not 
have been protected under the First Amendment but for Buck-
ley's holding that spending, or in this case raising money in order 
to spend money, is the equivalent of speech for First Amend-
ment pllrposes. And in another case, Hayes County Guardian v. 
Supple,14 the existence of paid advertising in a student newspaper 
was not sufficient to disentitle it to First Amendment protection 
in a challenge to a regulation banning the newspaper's distribu-
tion on campus. Once again, the Court cited Buckley for the 
proposition the government may not restrict the speech of some 
elements of society in order to enhance the relative voices of 
others, and hence the justification of fostering the education of 
students enrolled in the journalism program, which was produc-
ing a competing newspaper, was rejected. 
The intersection of the protection of speech and associa-
tional rights is illustrated by a series of cases successfully chal-
lenging state and local laws limiting the ability of charitable or-
ganizations to raise money. The first of these, Village of 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,15 involved a 
statute that forbade the solicitation of funds by an organization 
that did not spend at least 75% of the money raised on charita-
ble activities. The Village defended its law on the grounds that it 
prevented fraud-admittedly a worthy purpose-and argued 
that the group could engage in all the speech it wanted, as long 
as it did not try to raise money. After reviewing the cases in 
72. 134 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Cal. 1976). 
73. 797 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1986). 
74. 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992). 
75. 444 u.s. 620 (1980). 
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which the spending of money was protected by the First 
Amendment, the Court held that the activity at issue there was 
clearly protected.76 
Schaumberg was followed by Maryland v. Joseph H. Mun-
son Co.,71 in which a similar, but somewhat more flexible, statute, 
was also set aside, this time in a case brought by a professional 
fundraiser, not a charity. And in Riley v. National Federation of 
the Blind,78 the Court again struck down a fundraising provision, 
this one requiring mandatory disclosure of the percentage of 
money raised by professional fundraisers that ended up going to 
charity. Again, like Schaumberg, neither opinion cited Buckley, 
although its central proposition- that spending money can be 
speech for First Amendment purposes-was the foundation for 
the rulings. And in all three cases, the associational activities of 
those who supported the charity were an important part of the 
decisions. 
5. Non-Electoral Political Speech 
Closely related to speech involving an election among can-
didates is the issue of speech related to political subjects, such as 
legislative issues on a ballot. Here, too, the impact of Buckley 
has been significant. Two years after Buckley, and relying heav-
ily on it, the Court in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,79 
struck down a Massachusetts statute that prohibited corpora-
tions from making contributions or expenditures for the purpose 
of influencing ballot referenda. Again, that ruling would not ex-
ist but for Buckley's conclusion that spending money-even by a 
corporation- to make one's views known on issues of public im-
portance, is entitled to First Amendment protection. Similarly, 
in an area between issue advocacy, as in Belotti, and election ad-
vocacy, as in Buckley, the Court has allowed nonprofit corpora-
tions to make independent expenditures in support of candi-
dates, who agree with them on their issues, despite the ban on 
for-profit corporations making such expenditures, Federal Elec-
tion Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life.fll) Neither of 
those opinions could have reached these results without Buck-
76. The opinion cited Bares, but not Buckley; as noted above, even though Buckley 
had been a central pan of the decision in Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, which led to Bates. 
77. 467 U.S. 947 (1984). 
78. 487 u.s. 781 (1988). 
79. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
80. 479 u.s. 238 (1986). 
370 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 16:34 7 
ley's conclusion that money is speech in the context of a political 
campaign. 
A case involving anonymous leaflets opposing a proposed 
school tax levy also illustrates the importance of Buckley's 
equating spending money with speech in a political context. In 
Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,81 the Supreme Court set 
aside a $100 fine imposed against a pamphleteer who failed to 
disclose her identity. Buckley was cited for a number of proposi-
tions, but what is significant for these purposes is that, if the 
spending of money to produce the leaflets had been seen as con-
duct and not speech, the First Amendment might not have ap-
plied, and her conviction might have stood.82 
Another example where the result might well have been dif-
ferent if spending money were not treated as speech for First 
Amendment purposes, is Baldwin v. Redwood City.83 The city 
had a code governing the direction, location, and maintenance of 
all types of signs, with various specific provisions for temporary 
political signs, as well as aggregate restrictions on the number of 
permitted signs. Relying heavily on Buckley, the Court set aside 
the ordinance because it limited the quantity of campaign signs, 
and therefore political expression, for which there was no sub-
stantial countervailing interest. Indeed, limiting the quantity of 
signs, and necessarily the quantity of money spent, was the core 
purpose of the ordinance, and without Buckley, the law would 
probably have been sustained. 
Another attempt at limiting the quantity of political speech 
was held unconstitutional in San Francisco County Democratic 
Central Committee v. Eu.84 The restrictions there banned parti-
san pre-primary endorsements, and the Court cited Buckley to 
establish that the state may not restrict the speech of some per-
sons in order to enhance the relative voice of others. Once 
again, the issue of quantity, this time on a temporal rather than 
volume basis, was the underlying rationale that the Court re-
jected, as it had in Buckley. 
81. 514 U.S. 334 (1995) 
82 Mcintyre followed a similar ruling in Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (lOth Cir. 
1987), in which an Oklahoma statute forbidding the distribution of anonymous campaign 
literature was set aside on First Amendment grounds, as was a similar provision of the 
California Election Code in Schuster v. Imperial County Municipal Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 
447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
83. 540 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976). 
84. 792 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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CONCLUSION 
It is impossible to predict precisely what would happen if 
the expenditure limitation rulings in Buckley were overturned. 
However, there can be no serious doubt that the First Amend-
ment legal landscape beyond the campaign finance area, as well 
as within it, would be significantly altered. That would be true 
whether the Court concluded that spending money on elections 
is not speech (which would have a major impact on many prac-
tices that the courts have recently sustained), or it ruled that the 
governmental interest in leveling the playing field outweighs the 
interests of candidates and their supporters in unrestrained de-
bate (which would seem to undermine the basic relation be-
tween the government and the right to speak under the First 
Amendment). In either case, the ripple effect would extend not 
only to cases that have relied on Buckley, but also to those on 
which it relied and which are a central part of our First Amend-
ment jurisprudence. While individual cases may well have dis-
tinguishing features that might cause courts to reach the same 
result without Buckley, they would have to do so under a differ-
ent rationale. 
Although there are some rationales that the Court might 
adopt that would have lesser impacts, the likelihood of their 
adoption does not seem great and their impact in the campaign 
finance area, if adopted, might be quite limited. And even if 
their impact outside the campaign finance area would be differ-
ent, and perhaps less dramatic, they would surely have effects 
that should be considered. 
But if the broad grounds for overturning the expenditure 
limitations rulings in Buckley were used, it seems reasonably 
clear that a substantial body of First Amendment law would 
have to change. At the very least, there are major questions 
about whether these other First Amendment decisions would 
survive, and those who wish to see the demise of Buckley's ex-
penditure limitation rulings need to come to grips with these ef-
fects on other cases before their advocacy takes them to a place 
where they and their supporters do not want to be. 
